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UNACCOMPANIED MINORS' RIGHTS TO
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Thousands of foreign-born children enter the United States every
year. Many, particularly those crossing at the Mexican border, arrive
without legal immigration status and unaccompanied by adults. Once
here, these children have certain rights under the Constitution and the
immigration laws of this country. Their primary right is to a deportation
hearing. Under the current procedures used by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), however, these children are encouraged to
waive that right and "elect" voluntary departure. The voluntary depar-
ture process requires that they admit to having entered the country ille-
gally, choose the country to which they will return, and leave without
having had any hearing.' If the children are Mexican, as most are, they
spend a short time in a "staging facility" before they are quickly returned
to their homeland. If they come from a country that is not contiguous
with the United States, however, they are transferred to a long-term facil-
ity, where they remain until transportation is arranged back to their
home country.2
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1. See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 585 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755
(5th Cir. 1982).
2. Telephone interview with Ms. Chris Davis of the San Diego Sector Border Patrol of the
INS (May 26, 1987) [hereinafter INS Interview].
While detained, these children are refused contact with the outside. In recent testimony, it was
revealed that
[one child], seven years old, was held at a detention center for nearly six weeks: she did not
contact counsel, nor did she receive INS assistance to secure a representative to aid her.
[Another child], twelve years old when arrested and detained by agents, remained in cus-
tody for more than two weeks without contact with counsel or a representative from the
mexican or salvadoran [sic] consulate. He testified that he did not understand the forms
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Denying deportation hearings to unaccompanied minors is a signifi-
cant problem. From July through September 1987, 2190 juveniles (17
years old and younger) were apprehended by the INS in the San Diego
sector alone. 3 Of those 2190, 1827, or 83.4%, were unaccompanied.4
After being "processed" by INS officials, 1868 of these minors, or 85.3%,
voluntarily returned to their home country, while only 121, or 5%, asked
for a hearing.5
A waiver of the right to a deportation hearing must be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent;6 otherwise, the waiver is invalid. Without the
advice of counsel, illiterate in the English language, often denied ade-
quate translation, and ignorant of American culture and its judicial sys-
tem, unaccompanied minor aliens cannot knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently waive their right to a deportation hearing. 7 Mandatory de-
portation hearings therefore are essential to protect these children's
rights.
presented to him or the significance of the volunteer attorney list; agents did not explain
the forms. [The questioning agent] stated that it was not his practice to contact the consu-
late of a minor .... nor was he aware of different INS procedures for processing children
below 14 years, or between the ages of 14 to 16.
Post-Trial Brief of Plaintiffs at 15, Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (No. 81-
1457) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief].
The effects of isolation for these young children are exacerbated by attempts to limit their use of
the telephone. One 15-year old child "was kept four days in detention without being allowed access
to a phone," while another "requested to make a phone call before signing the papers and several
times afterward, and was denied." Id. at 23. Yet another minor alien "was held incommunicado for
six days in a detention room for minors... despite the fact that he and most of the other thirty
detainees would routinely ask the guards to telephone whenever the cell door was opened." Id. at
24.
3. Known as the busiest section in the nation, the San Diego Sector covers the ten to fifteen
mile California-Mexico border near Tijuana. INS Interview, supra note 2.
4. There were 1653 Mexican children and 174 children from other countries (approximately
75% of the non-Mexican children were from El Salvador). Id.
5. Id.
6. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 374 n.27 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (reiterating nec-
essary components of waiver as matter of federal constitutional law).
7. The nature of the "voluntary" departure procedure suggests the nonvolitional character of
the minors' decisions. For example, in recent testimony
several children stated that INS agents simply provided the advisal [of their rights and the
necessary] forms and directed them to sign them; they testified that by virtue of the agents'
authority and instruction, they had no choice, meaningful or otherwise. Some... asked
agents specific questions regarding their rights and were either provided incorrect informa-
tion or were ignored. [One child] testified that she was given the advisal, but that the
processing agent said he was in a hurry. Several other children.., testified that the agents
were talking to them in loud, stern voices, were acting impatient, upset, or angry, and that
as a consequence, each felt afraid to ask any questions. Some of the witnesses ... stated
that agents continued questioning them though they cried throughout the interrogation.
Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While it is a nation's fundamental right to exclude or admit foreign-
ers, 8 once they are inside the United States, whether legally or not, they
are entitled to the guarantees of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.9 These guarantees protect against denial of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without "due process of law." 10 "It is well-settled that the right to a
deportation hearing is of constitutional scope because deportation 'in-
volves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present
upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life it-
self.' ",1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that "aliens who have
once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law."12
Clearly, then, these children are entitled to due process. But, "what
process is due?"1 3 Due process is a flexible concept, requiring different
procedures in different contexts.14 Outside the deportation setting, the
Supreme Court has established that "[a] fundamental requirement of due
process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' "15 Additionally, such opportu-
nity "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner."1 6 Expanding on this concept, lower courts have ruled that, to
satisfy due process, the exercise of a right that was created to protect
constitutional entitlements-such as a deportation hearing-must be
feasible. 17
More specific requirements for deportation hearings have been es-
tablished by the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act).1 8 Under
the Act, deportability must be established at a hearing for which the alien
has had reasonable opportunity to be present and reasonable notice of the
charges.' 9 At the hearing, the alien is entitled to be represented by coun-
8. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1984).
9. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 n.32 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (quoting Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950)).
12. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
13. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
14. Id.
15. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914)).
16. Id. at 552.
17. See, eg., Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). For
a discussion of Haitian Refugee Center, see infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
18. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982) [hereinafter INA].
19. Id. § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
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sel, present evidence, cross examine witnesses, and examine and object to
evidence offered by the Justice Department's attorney (in effect, the pros-
ecutor).20 Federal regulations additionally require that the proceedings
and documents presented in a foreign language will be accurately trans-
lated, and that the immigration judge inform the alien of available proce-
dural rights and free legal services. 21
Because Congress and the courts have recognized these due process
rights for aliens, it follows that the waiver of these rights should be ac-
corded equally stringent regard. 22 This Comment argues that deporta-
tion hearings may not be waived by unaccompanied minor aliens; due
process in this context demands mandatory deportation hearings.
II. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE TO UNACCOMPANIED MINOR ALIENS?
A. Denial of Liberty and Property Interests.
In deportation cases, when INS procedures threaten a life, liberty,
or property interest as envisioned by the fifth amendment, a constitution-
ally-recognized interest is at stake and the foreigner is entitled to due
process protections. 23 These protections are triggered when unaccompa-
nied minor aliens are asked to sign voluntary departure forms; the cur-
rent INS procedures used in processing these children not only threaten,
but truly deny them both their liberty and property interests.24
The liberty interest that exists in a foreigner's right to remain in the
United States was recognized as early as 1903 in the Japanese Immigrant
Case:25
20. Id. §§ 242(b)(2), (3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(2), (3).
21. 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.12, .16(a) (1987).
22. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376-77 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
23. Cf Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972) (analyzing the nature of procedures
due individuals involved in parole revocation); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-72
(1972) (discussing "liberty" and "property" interests as triggering devices for due process require-
ments under the fourteenth amendment in case involving nonrenewal of teacher's contract at state
school).
24. To date, the interest in life, as stated in the due process clause, has not been held to be
affected in these cases.
25. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Other courts have found that life, liberty, and property interests are
protected not only by the Constitution, but also by positive rules of law. See, eg., Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) ("[A] person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty
itself is a statutory creation of the state."); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) ("A property
interest in employment can... be created by ordinance .. "); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73
(1975) ("Protected interests in property are normally ... created ... by an independent source such
as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits."); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557 (1974) (when the state created the right to "good time," the prisoner's interest was well within
fourteenth amendment liberty); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parole system creates
protected interest in continued liberty); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ("Relevant
constitutional restraints apply ... to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits .... ).
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[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as hold-
ing, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental
principles that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that no
person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some
time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon
which that liberty depends .... 26
Cases that followed Japanese Immigrant reiterated this view. For
example, in 1985, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 27 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the federal regulations
establishing asylum procedures,28 as well as the United Nations Protocol
that the United States signed in 1968,29 created a liberty interest that
protects refugees and asylum applicants. 30 The court also found, in the
fifth amendment's property clause, due process protections for Haitians
and other refugees from countries experiencing civil strife.31 The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the INS's accelerated deportation process
and its knowing creation of scheduling conflicts and unattainable filing
deadlines for Haitian applicants violated the Constitution; the court em-
phasized that for the United States' commitment to the United Nations
Protocol to have any significance, the foreign-born at least must be given
the chance to seek political asylum-even though the grant of asylum is
ultimately discretionary.32 Indeed, the court noted that government con-
duct violates "the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due pro-
cess when it creates a right.., and then makes the exercise of that right
utterly impossible."' 33 The court therefore ordered the INS to adhere to
its established procedure-notice and a hearing at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.34
26. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100-01.
27. 676 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1980), repealed, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,118 (1981).
29. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, arts. 1, 32, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6261,
6275, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The Protocol prohibits the expulsion of any individual
who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion." The individual can be excluded, however, on
grounds of "national security or public order"-but due process must be met before expulsion is
enforced. Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1028 n.8.
30. 676 F.2d at 1029. In Parker v. Cook, the court conceded that the government rarely labels
its actions as creating "liberty interests," necessitating ajudicial review of"the substance of the state
action to determine whether a liberty interest has been created." 642 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981). Another court found that the President had "invited" tens of thousands of Cubans to this
country and his invitation gave rise to a protected liberty interest that could not be impaired without
due process of law. Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 896-901 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
31. 676 F.2d at 1039.
32. Id. at 1038.
33. Id. at 1040.
34. Id. at 1038.
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The Second Circuit's reasoning in Augustin v. Sava 35 supports the
Fifth Circuit's decision. Using a similar analysis, the Augustin court rea-
soned that by treaty, statute and regulations, the United States had mani-
fested its intention to hear pleas of aliens who claimed a fear of
persecution in their homelands. 36 The court noted that while this inten-
tion does not necessarily grant the privilege of asylum to all who enter
the United States, it does grant the right to be heard on those pleas.
Thus detainees have a constitutionally-protected right to petition and
present an asylum claim.37
B. Deportation Proceedings.
Even though a liberty or property interest has been created, a depor-
tation hearing is only mandatory if due process will be denied when a
hearing is not granted. The Supreme Court has created a balancing test
to determine whether due process mandates a particular procedure.38
The factors considered under the test are (1) the private interests affected
by the official action, (2) the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the
private interests] through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of [the suggested] safeguard," and (3) the government interests af-
fected by the suggested change, "including the.., fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the [change] would entail."'39
Lower federal courts have used the Supreme Court's balancing test
to find that various procedures followed by the INS did not meet the
minimum requirements mandated by the due process clause. In Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith,40 as discussed above,41 the Fifth Circuit held
that the INS's accelerated deportation procedure denied due process to
Haitian refugees. In applying the balancing test, the court found that (1)
the Haitians had a strong interest in proving the entitlement of asylum,
(2) there was a high risk of erroneous determinations, and (3) the extra
burden on the government was minimal, as the court only required ad-
herence to established procedures. 42
35. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 36-37; see Anker & Rubin, The Right to Adequate Translation in Asylum Proceedings,
9 IMMIGRATION J., July-Sept., 1986, at 10, 19.
37. 735 F.2d at 37.
38. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
39. Id.; cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).
40. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
41. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
42. 676 F.2d at 1040. The court also noted without explication that "it is... in the govern-
ment's interest to make informed determinations." Ide; see also Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37-38 (noting
that due process likely violated by failing to provide accurate translators in asylum proceedings and
that due process warrants hearings for aliens likely to be persecuted in their homelands).
VCol. 1988:114]
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In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 43 a federal district court also found
that INS procedures failed to satisfy due process. The court granted in-
junctive relief to prohibit the use of INS procedures that effectively co-
erced Salvadoran aliens into signing voluntary departure forms in lieu of
requesting deportation hearings.44 The court found that INS agents dis-
closed only certain facts when the foreigners were deciding whether to
choose voluntary departure, emphasizing only the "down" side of the
situation.45 Although the court did not specifically use the balancing test
in finding that the Salvadorans had been denied their constitutional and
statutory rights, it did note that the risks to the Salvadorans from denial
of a deportation hearing outweighed any hardship to the INS.46 In dicta,
the court used the balancing test as a secondary rationale for requiring
that affirmative notice of the right to petition for asylum be granted to
the Salvadoran aliens.47
43. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
44. Id. at 374.
45. Id. at 373.
46. Id. at 374.
47. Id. at 378 n.33. In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the argument that due process mandates that excludable aliens receive notice of their right
to apply for political asylum. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 979, 982 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472
U.S. 846 (1985). The court's reasoning was three-fold. First, "Congress made no direct reference to
a notice requirement"; second, "Congress provides many opportunities... without requiring the
government to publicize their availability," such as "the right to seek educational loans or public
assistance"; and third, frivolous claims would be encouraged by informing all aliens of the right. 727
F.2d at 982-83.
Four members of the court filed a powerful dissent, reasoning that if the Act is "to have 'mean-
ing' and the constitutionally protected right to petition for asylum.., is to have any substance, [the
aliens] must be informed that the procedures and rights provided by the Act are available to them."
Id. at 989-90. Moreover, notice would effectuate Congress's intent: Congress passed the Refugee
Act to "'give statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian
concerns.'" Id. at 989 (quoting S. Rmi,. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141). The dissent pointed out that it is inappropriate to liken this
situation to one of educational loans and public assistance because the aliens that Congress hoped to
aid by the Act "frequently arrive on our shores ignorant of our legal system and unschooled in our
language." Id. at 989. Finally, the dissent noted that while it is true that fewer claims will be filed if
aliens are not notified of their rights, those with legitimate claims will lose their right to petition,
"effectively emasculating the very rights that Congress intended to create." Id. at 990 n.ll.
Jean's applicability should be limited for two reasons. First, Jean concerned only the rights of
excludable aliens-foreigners who, by a legal fiction that is applied during an "exclusion" hearing,
may be kept from even entering the United States. See id. at 961 & n.1. The aliens of concern in this
comment already have entered the country and are subject only to deportation. Second, according
to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals improperly reached the constitutional question in Jean,
as there were nonconstitutional statutory and regulatory grounds that should have been the basis for
the decision. 472 U.S. 846, 848, 854 (1985) (proper grounds were the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act and the Naturalization Service Regulations).
In Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, the Fifth Circuit held that the INS's refusal to give blanket notice of
the right to petition for asylum frustrated neither congressional purposes nor the Constitution. 745
F.2d 937, 943 (5th Cir. 1984). Ramirez however, was based on a criticism of previous cases that
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C. Due Process Requires Mandatory Deportation Hearings for
Unaccompanied Minor Aliens.
When unaccompanied minor aliens are deprived of a deportation
hearing, the resulting harm to their private interests is substantial and
significant--"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."'48 Hence, when
considering the legal interest of these unaccompanied children, one must
heed the solicitude the law affords them.49 Indeed, application of the
Court-created balancing test strongly supports the conclusion that depor-
tation hearings must be mandatory for unaccompanied minor aliens.
The first part of the test examines the private interests affected by
the official action. These particular children have significant interests
that are forfeited when they erroneously elect voluntary departure.
Waiving the statutory right to a deportation proceeding results in the
simultaneous waiver of numerous other statutory rights: for example,
representation by counsel, examination of adverse evidence, presentation
of exculpatory evidence and cross-examination of witnesses.50 These
rights can hardly be deemed insignificant.
Unaccompanied children also have substantial interests in the many
alternatives available under the Act: political asylum,51 withholding of
deportation,5 2 adjustment of status,5 3 suspension of deportation,54 and
deferred action status.55 Not surprisingly, the United States District
had failed to counterbalance administrative necessity in making the determination that due process
required blanket notice of a constitutional right. Ia at 945-46. Thus, Ramirez should be limited to
cases in which "the additional administrative burdens that might result" outweigh the benefit that
would ensue from the change in procedure. Id. at 946. Indeed, Ramirez itself recognizes the neces-
sity of giving notice to "high risk populations," id. at 947, which certainly defines the unaccompa-
nied alien children at issue here.
48. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16, 116 n.12 (1982) (recognizing, in criminal law context, that youth "is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)
(noting, in mental health context, that "[mlost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to
make sound judgments concerning many decisions").
49. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17, 30 (1967) (discussing special policy ofparens patriae
applied to minors); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 550 (1966) (same).
50. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing statutory right to deportation
hearings).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
52. Id. § 1253(h).
53. Id. § 1254(a).
54. Id.
55. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service Operating Instruction 103.1(a)(1)(iii) (1978), which authorized district director to grant
status deferring deportation indefinitely for humanitarian reasons). The current operating instruc-
tion, 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1981), which superseded the 1978 instruction, seriously undermines the ration-
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Court for the Central District of California agrees that minors' constitu-
tional rights are deprived when they waive their right to a deportation
hearing because they do not understand the panoply of rights their
waiver abandons:
it is a reasonable conclusion that many unaccompanied minors consent
to voluntary departure without knowledge that there are other alterna-
tives available.... Having determined that most ... waive rights
which they could not know of when they consent to voluntary depar-
ture, it follows that these waivers of rights, because they are not made
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, are ineffective [and effect] a
de facto deprivation of these minors' constitutional rights.56
The second part of the test, which considers the harm resulting from
the government procedure and the benefits ensuing from the suggested
safeguards, also weighs in favor of the proposed change. Under current
INS procedures, the risk of erroneous results-that is, returning a child.
who has a legitimate claim to remain in the United States-is great. Rea-
sonable consideration of the age, experience, educational level, intelli-
gence and cultural and language background of these children 57 suggests
that unaccompanied minor aliens understand neither the INS form, the
nature of their rights, nor the consequences of exercising or waiving
those rights. Thus, the risk of error is both substantial and likely. More-
over, the benefits that would result from implementing the suggested
change-mandatory deportation hearings for all unaccompanied mi-
nors-are manifest.
The third part of the balancing test examines the government inter-
ests affected by the suggested change. Concerns with administrative effi-
ciency and ensuring greater compliance with constitutional and statutory
commands 58 suggest that mandating deportation hearings for these chil-
dren is actually in the government's interest. Mandatory deportation
hearings are likely to increase governmental efficiency and ensure greater
procedural compliance by alleviating the sporadic and uncertain efforts
occasionally taken by the INS to inject fairness into the deportation pro-
cess. The INS is hampered both by language difficulties between the
ale in Nicholas. Romeiro De Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the new
instruction has been viewed as conferring no rights on aliens; instead, it operates "'merely for the
INS's own convenience.'" Id. (quoting Siverts v. Craig, 602 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Haw. 1985)).
56. Perez-Funez v. INS, 611 F. Supp. 990, 1002-03 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
57. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (Authorities must take into account
"those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and
education and with immature judgment, are involved.").
58, Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 374 (C.D. Cal. 1982); cf Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (finding government interest in affording hearing before termina-
tion of welfare benefits because it would foster commitment to "dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders").
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Border Patrol agents and the detained children 59 and by the "legal lan-
guage" of the fights. Some Border Patrol agents repeatedly rephrase the
wording of the statements of rights in response to the children's ques-
tions about the legal words and concepts. 6° Hence, the nature of the
"explanation given, if any, depends upon the individual agent and cir-
cumstances at the time of interrogation."'61
The suggested change, requiring deportation hearings for all unac-
companied minor aliens, will not place undue strain upon the courts.
The new process will apply only to unaccompanied minors-the most
vulnerable of all. Even if a strain on the court system does develop, any
administrative burden is clearly outweighed by the private interests at
stake. 62
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA
Psychological research supports the conclusion that detained chil-
dren cannot make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of their
legal rights. In one recent study, for example, Thomas Grisso found that
a majority of American juveniles were not competent to waive their Mi-
randa rights.63 Although Miranda rights apply only in criminal proceed-
ings and not in the deportation context, the results of Grisso's research
are still instructive, for they suggest that the majority of juveniles-even
those who are native English speakers-cannot knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive any legal rights, whether civil or criminal.
59. Spanish is the only language of the vast majority of the minor aliens. While some INS
Border Patrol agents speak native Spanish, many have taken no courses in the language other than
the 19-week training course at the Border Patrol Academy. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 5 n.l.
60. Id. at 4-5. The terms that are frequently misunderstood include: "deportation hearing,"
"bail," "voluntary departure," and "asylum." Id.
61. Id.
62. Cf Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265-66 (finding that in the welfare context increased fiscal and
administrative burden is outweighed by private interests of recipients).
63. T. GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE
59-88 (1981). Grisso's "results indicate that understanding [of the Miranda rights] is indeed deficient
in [the twelve or below] age range compared to the overall juvenile sample, with inadequate under-
standing present in about three of four cases in this age range (compared to about one of two for the
total sample)." Id at 89. His results also show, however, that between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen "age itself ceased to account for individual differences in understanding." Id. at 90. Thus,
Grisso recommends that, while age and intelligence should serve as "legal indicants" in determining
a juvenile's ability competently to waive her legal rights, intelligence should weigh more heavily in
later teenage years. Id
One may infer from Grisso's finding of the decreased significance of age between the ages of
fourteen and sixteen that "intelligent" older minors would have a greater understanding of their
legal rights than would less intelligent minors. This reasoning, however, is inapplicable to the pres-
ent inquiry; even an intelligent older minor in Mexico or El Salvador, for example, and even one who
is literate in English, would be unfamiliar with American legal institutions and would necessarily
still have difficulty understanding American legal rights.
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A. Can Juveniles Knowingly Waive Miranda Rights?
Grisso examined the ability of juveniles to comprehend Miranda
rights. He assumed that if the rights are understood, then the element of
"knowing," as required by the fifth amendment in cases of waiver, is
fulfilled.6 Grisso used three methods to determine whether the juveniles
understood the Miranda rights. First, he asked the juveniles to para-
phrase the warnings after they heard them read aloud and saw them dis-
played on printed cards.65 The results of this method showed that only
20% understood all four Miranda warnings; 55% misunderstood at least
one warning, and the remaining 25% had only "questionable" under-
standing of the warnings. 66
Grisso next asked the juveniles to define key words in the Miranda
warnings; he assumed that even a seemingly accurate paraphrase could
conceal misconception if the subjects had not understood the important
words in the warning.67 In this instance, six key words of the Miranda
warnings were read to the juveniles, who then saw the same words dis-
played on printed cards.6 8 After listening to a sentence using one of the
words, the juveniles were asked to explain what the word meant.69
Nearly two-thirds of the juveniles misunderstood at least one of the six
words. 70
Finally, Grisso asked the juveniles to identify and match precon-
structed sentences with meanings similar to those found in the warnings.
Again, a Miranda warning was shown and read to the juveniles. The
juveniles were then asked to determine whether other sentences that were
read aloud by the examiners had meanings similar to the Miranda warn-
ings.7 1 In this, as in the first measure, the juveniles demonstrated an
inadequate understanding of their right to have an attorney before and
during interrogation; their understanding of their right to have an attor-
ney appointed was even poorer than it was in the first measure. 72 Indeed,
approximately 30% of the juveniles answered incorrectly in at least one
of three cases. 73
64, T. GRISsO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS
114-18 (1986).
65. T. GRIsso, supra note 63, at 48-51.
66. Id. at 73, 74 table 6.
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id. at 51-52. The six words used were "consult," "attorney," "interrogation," "appoint,"
"entitled," and "right." Id.
69. Id. at 52.
70. Id. at 75-77.
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 78 table 8.
73. Id.
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Drawing from the results of all three methods of determining com-
petency, Grisso concluded that about half of the juveniles aged ten to
sixteen misunderstood at least one of the Miranda rights. 74 This misun-
derstanding was significantly higher among those under the age of four-
teen.75 The results speak for themselves: overwhelmingly, juveniles
cannot knowingly waive their Miranda rights.
B. Can Juveniles Intelligently Waive Miranda Rights?
To test the ability of juveniles to intelligently waive Miranda rights,
Grisso studied the juveniles' understanding of the purpose and function
of these rights. 76 He assumed that competence to waive a right requires
not only an understanding of the right, but also an understanding of its
significance. 77 Indeed, in the Miranda setting, if a defendant lacks this
understanding, a court is not justified in ruling that a waiver is valid.78
Thus, Grisso measured comprehension of the significance of the right to
remain silent, the function of defense attorneys, and the role of police in
interrogation. 79
Not surprisingly, the research demonstrated that many juveniles do
not understand the significance of the right to remain silent. One-third
believed that defense attorneys defend only the innocent. 80 Many be-
lieved that a police officer could lawfully persuade a person not to remain
silent, and "a majority... believed that a judge could revoke a person's
right" to remain silent.81 Based on these misconceptions, a waiver of the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel cannot be considered
intelligent.
Grisso also explored the way juveniles decide whether or not to
waive their rights.82 Here, when presented with hypothetical questions,
the juveniles under fourteen years old considered fewer alternatives,
fewer possible consequences, and more immediate than long-range conse-
quences.83 The same conclusion held for the juveniles of a distinct cul-
tural minority (in this case blacks). 84
74. Id. at 192.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 109-30.
77. Id. at 109.
78. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
79. T. Gmso, supra note 63, at 110-12.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 131-60.
83. Id. at 157-60.
84. Id.
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C. Can Juveniles Voluntarily Waive Miranda Rights?
To determine whether juveniles exercise their rights without inhibi-
tion and thus act voluntarily when making waiver decisions, Grisso com-
piled data on how frequently the juveniles invoked the right to remain
silent.85 He assumed that if adults exercised this right significantly more
than did children, the children's inhibition would be attributable to lack
of voluntariness. 86 In the jurisdiction studied, approximately three-
quarters of the juveniles who were arrested for felonious crimes were in-
terrogated by police, but only about 10% of them asserted their right to
remain silent.87 Moreover, children under fifteen almost never exercised
the right to remain silent, whereas adults asserted the right in 42.7% of
the cases. 88 In addition, while a majority of juveniles suggested obtaining
legal counsel in response to hypotheticals about interrogation and
waiver, once arrested very few actually requested lawyers. 89 This study
presents even stronger evidence that juveniles are inhibited in the exercise
of their rights. Thus, their actions cannot be truly voluntary.90
In sum, Grisso's research revealed that American juveniles under
fourteen are overwhelmingly unable to knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waive their legal rights.91 Even without further empirical re-
search, one would expect that foreign-born children, necessarily from a
distinct culture, would also have difficulty understanding their legal
rights.
In fact, foreign children are at an even greater disadvantage. First,
unlike most American children, foreign-born juveniles generally are not
fluent in English. Second, American legal institutions (such as courts
and hearings) and the freedoms that America grants are unfamiliar to
many foreign-born children. Because a majority of American juveniles
cannot make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of their Mi-
randa rights,92 it is inconceivable that foreign children, not only suffering
85. Id. at 25-39.
86. Id. at 25-26.
87. Id. at 38.
88. Id. at 25, 38, 191 (citing Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgk A Statistical Study,
29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967)).
89. Id. at 192-93.
90. High rates of obedience and compliance among children, especially adolescents aged 11-14,
also have been documented. Id. at 26 (citing Constanza & Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age
Level, 27 CHILD DEv. 967-75 (1966); Patel & Gordon, Some Personal and Situational Determinants
of Yielding to Influence, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 411-18 (1960)). Another researcher devel-
oped characteristics that correlate with higher rates of compliance. See id at 25 (citing Driver,
Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42-61 (1968)). While adults
possess some of these qualities in varying degrees, juveniles characteristically possess more of them.
91. T. GRISSO, supra note 63, at 191-94.
92. Id.
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the difficulties of youth, but also unfamiliar with both the American judi-
cial process and the English language, can make a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of similar legal rights. The only logical alternative, then, to
protect the interests of these children, is to afford all unaccompanied mi-
nor aliens deportation hearings.
While a deportation hearing provides no assurance that a foreigner
will be afforded all protections available under the law, certainly counsel
at a hearing would diligently represent his or her client. Even without
the benefit of counsel, however, the immigration judge is duty-bound to
uphold all laws and follow the Constitution. 93 Thus, there is little doubt
that a foreigner is much more likely to be adequately protected by Amer-
ican laws if granted a deportation hearing than if denied one.
Some critics will suggest that if the INS waiver were merely re-
worded or a translator were provided, then the problems with the current
procedures would be remedied. Two other studies on Miranda rights
and juveniles suggest, however, that these measures would be wholly in-
adequate. 94 Both studies demonstrate that simplifying the Miranda
warnings does not result in greater understanding.95 Similarly, even a
better understanding of the INS form would not necessarily result in a
fully valid waiver. Grisso's research establishes that merely understand-
ing the words on a form does not demonstrate that one understands the
significance of those words.96 For example, understanding that Miranda
afforded a general right to silence, but believing that the right could be
revoked, strongly illustrates a "failure to sense the legal protection be-
hind the right." 97 Misconceiving the right as conditional would result in
an invalid waiver.
Likewise, merely providing a translator would not ensure a know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to a deportation hear-
ing. While translation may -help provide a better understanding of the
spoken words, again it would not ensure that the detained children
would understand the significance of those words. Because American-
born children suffer such grave difficulties understanding their legal
rights, the logical assumption is that foreign youngsters' potential diffi-
culties are even greater.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1982).
94. See T. GRISSO, supra note 63, at 197 (citing Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile
Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39-54 (1970); S. Manoogian, Factors Affecting Juveniles' Compre-
hension of Miranda Rights (1978) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, St. Louis University)).
95. Id.. While not ruling out the possibility that a certain rewording would be better under-
stood, the researchers questioned whether "any single rewording of the warnings would suffice, given
the wide range of cultural, linguistic, and educational backgrounds of juvenile suspects." Id.
96. Id. at 109-30.
97. Id. at 128-29.
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CONCLUSION
The inability of unaccompanied minor aliens to understand their
legal rights is particularly clear when one contrasts the very different so-
cial and political experiences of most aliens with that of most Americans.
Early experiences have taught many aliens not only to mistrust govern-
ments, but also to fear them. Once arrested in this country, these same
aliens are herded into detention centers. Unaccompanied minor aliens,
who typically are unable to speak English, ignorant of the American sys-
tem, and undoubtedly frightened, will certainly choose the option they
perceive the adult in charge wants them to choose when they are asked to
decide between voluntary departure and a deportation hearing.98 Thus,
their "choice" is not only involuntary, it is really no choice at all.
When waiving a deportation hearing after being apprehended by
INS Border Patrol Agents, these unaccompanied children undoubtedly
fail to consider the myriad of rights they waive in addition to that of a
deportation hearing. If deportation hearings were to become mandatory
for these children, those who would have waived a constitutional right to
a hearing and all that is consequent to that right, those who would have
waived statutory rights to apply for political asylum, suspension of de-
portation, refugee status, and adjustment of status, and those who may
have been returned to a land hostile towards them would be permitted to
exercise their due process rights and be protected as American law
prescribes. The value of this safeguard is immeasurable; it is the value of
life itself.
98. See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
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